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Separation-survivability – the elusive 
moral cut-off point?
To the Editor: De Roubaix and Van Niekerk1 correctly point out 
that the utilitarian position holding that fetal life has no value 
cannot be defended, and argue that the Choice on Termination 
of Pregnancy Act is ethically deficient because it does not 
accord the fetus any moral significance. The notion of sentience 
as a measure of value is simply not defensible.  Their argument 
that separation-survivability is the absolute moral cut-off point 
for termination of pregnancy is compelling and should inform 
our profession and bring pressure to bear on redrafting this Act. 
A limitation of the paper is that it could not examine the 
moral impact on persons who make a utilitarian decision to end 
a fetal life that was entrusted to their protection.  The potential 
or complete humanity of that life can be denied and the need to 
grieve repressed until some later event confronts such persons 
with its attendant grief and guilt.  Many crises can break this 
cycle of denial, for example divorce or the death of a spouse 
or child, desire that the child from a later pregnancy should 
survive, and the sight of an ultrasound picture of a fetus of the 
same gestational age.  They then discover what Raskolnikov 
found in Dostoyevsky’s novel, Crime and Punishment, when 
he murdered the despicable old woman moneylender: that 
the most apparently useless individuals have value – have 
what theologians call the image of God upon them.  The more 
prolonged the pregnancy, the more profound is this reaction, 
which supports De Roubaix and Van Niekerk’s graded position 
on the value of prenatal life.
Health care workers who have to perform terminations of 
pregnancy face the same feelings of grief and guilt.  That partly 
explains their frequent anger or distant stance taken against 
women seeking abortions – and why so many midwives burn 
out when they are compelled to do this work. Supervisors 
should provide counselling and support, and the opportunity 
to work in another area, rather than a disciplinary response.
Some hold that such grief and guilt are conditioned and 
should not be felt.  Suggesting that the deep nurturing and 
protective drives in humans should not exist is dangerous for 
the effective nurturing of children, the sacrificial love needed 
for marriage, old age, and the sacrificial attitude to the sanctity 
of persons needed to be a good health care worker.
Grief and guilt are distressing to those affected, and 
for persons involved in terminations of pregnancies who 
experience it, healing only comes when it is honestly 
faced. Distress can affect family relationships before help is 
found. There is therefore a moral and ethical imperative of 
thorough counselling of persons seeking an abortion.  None 
should be allowed to undertake it lightly without careful 
evaluation of the cost to their personalities and families.  They 
should be assisted to find solutions to the problems created 
by the pregnancy, and options including adoption or foster 
care, getting employment, counselling of the couple together, 
ensuring maintenance is paid through pregnancy and 
childhood, and securing emergency housing and emergency 
financial aid should be explored. 
No health care worker should be pressured to take part 
in or perform terminations of pregnancy against their 
conscience.  The need for adequate pre-abortion counselling, 
and for health care workers to be free to follow the dictates of 
their conscience in this matter, should be written into any new 
legislation and acknowledged in our present practice.
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To the Editor: When arguing for a particular moral position, 
philosophers should provide a fair representation of the 
opponents’ view – and in this case not focus solely on some 
weaknesses of some utilitarians.1 Granted the authors’ right 
to defend their essentially ‘pro-life’ stance, the use of an 
ideological vocabulary, such as feticide, killing and partial 
birth abortion, is disparaging for those who do not share their 
‘pro-life’ position. Defending their own position they talk about 
viable fetuses, neonates, infants, babies and toddlers. It would 
be more appropriate to use the neutral medical vocabulary: 
zygote, embryo, fetus and neonate.
The argument is that ‘separation-survivability is the only 
morally acceptable cut-off point’ after which termination 
of pregnancy is morally unacceptable. The title ends with a 
question mark and adds the qualification that it is elusive (i.e. 
misleading). The argument from viability used as a legal cut-off 
dates back to the Roe v. Wade case in 1973 in the USA. In 1995, 
H J Gert made a philosophical argument against viability as 
a moral cut-off,2 namely, ‘it is far from clear why one’s moral 
status would change as one develops the ability to survive 
on one’s own’. Furthermore, the question was raised how an 
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outside factor such as medical technology can have a bearing 
on one’s moral status? 
In logic, premises are true or false. The conclusion is valid if 
supported by the premises. An argument is sound if it is valid 
and if the premises are true. The authors’ conclusion states: ‘a 
human being that can survive on its own has every right not to 
be killed’.1 A 25-week-neonate cannot survive on its own but 
is entirely dependent on the availability of medical technology 
and expertise. Do the premises support the conclusion?
The argument from potentiality states that from fertilisation 
(rather than conception) the zygote has the potential to 
evolve into a mature and rational human being. Whether this 
materialises or not is irrelevant. It is potential that gives the 
zygote-embryo-fetus its moral standing and the attached right 
to life. The authors reject the argument from sentience – only a 
presentient or insentient embryo-fetus can be aborted3-4 – but 
propose the same gradualist approach (i.e. a pre-person has a 
right to life). In other words, before 25 weeks the embryo-fetus 
has no personhood (but the potential to become a person); from 
25 weeks on it is a pre-person (until when?).
The second premise claims that the world cannot exist with-
out human beings, a characteristically strict anthropomorphic 
position that is easily dispelled by looking at evolution. Man 
is a latecomer on this planet. The premise does not support the 
conclusion and is false.
The third premise is similar to the first, stating that the pre-
person has the same moral importance as the term neonate. A 
pre-person is no more a person in the philosophical sense (i.e. 
rationality, command of language, self-consciousness, control 
or agency, moral worth)5 than a term neonate. The premise only 
states what is the conclusion.
The fourth premise, the moral unacceptability of infanticide, 
is a conclusion and not a premise.
Although the term abortion does not appear in the title, 
the first sentence sets the stage: this is about abortion, which 
is ‘the termination of pregnancy … before the fetus reaches 
viability (currently regarded as 24 weeks in the UK)’.6 Hence, 
a pre-person can be terminated, not aborted. This is not just 
semantics. Termination after viability is usually practised for 
medical indications to prevent harm to the pregnant woman. 
One could even say that this no more morally justified than 
before viability (a topic not really addressed by the authors) 
unless it is from self-defence. However, self-defence requires an 
aggressor and the zygote-embryo-fetus is innocent.
The ‘elusive cut-off’ lends moral support to third-trimester 
fetuses. It illustrates the difficulty to convincingly argue for 
an intermediate position between pro-life and pro-choice. 
Moreover, it can be misleading (elusive). Personhood requires 
individuality; because individuality is not finalised before 
12 weeks, the pre-embryo (much less a clone) cannot be a 
person. We know when personhood ends (irreversible coma, 
permanent vegetative stage), not when it starts. The potential 
for personhood is there from fertilisation; when it actualises is 
less definable. If a sliding scale were to start at 1 and end at 10, 
where on the scale is the pre-person?
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Dr De Roubaix replies: Dr Larsen makes a valid point on the 
necessity of adequate counselling. A grieving process similar 
to that following bereavement may occur after spontaneous 
and interventional abortion, since strong maternal bonds may 
be present before 12 weeks’ gestation.1 Moreover, spouses and 
partners may also experience a feeling of loss. Grieving is more 
likely following spontaneous than therapeutic abortion, and 
I would expect this to apply to TOP as well, when pregnancy 
is unplanned and unwelcome. But because of the complexity 
that surrounds termination and the need for rapid decision 
and action, guilt feelings may surface even some time after 
termination. Therefore counselling should be mandatory (at 
present Act 92 of 1996, the TOP act, only recommends it), 
though of course it would be difficult for the State to comply.
Dr Van Bogaert seems to be generally critical, with 
accusations of one-sidedness, that we attempt to support a pro-
life position, the ideological use of vocabulary and the use of 
the word ‘elusive’ in the title. He is critical of the survivability 
cut-off argument, misunderstands our position on survivability, 
criticises the logic of our argument and voices some of the 
problems with the intermediate position on abortion. Our 
article is not a comprehensive critique of utilitarianism, whose 
concept of personhood has rendered influential support to the 
arguments for free choice in abortion (even though the central 
argument is female reproductive autonomy, as Act 92 of 1996 
clearly sets out in the preamble). Peter Singer,2 Michael Tooley3 
and John Harris4  freely concede that consistent application 
of their personhood argument has the inevitable problematic 
of legitimising the killing of neonates since they, too, are 
not yet moral persons. This concession enables criticism of 
their argument, but that does not mean that we are pro-life 
in the accepted sense. Van Bogaert may have misread, or 
misunderstood, our argument. We believe that termination 
is always a moral matter, but also that the moral significance 
of prenatal life is not necessarily absolute and should be 
contextualised against a variety of other arguments. We do 
not argue that every pregnancy should necessarily proceed to 
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term, only that separation survivability might be a moral cut-off 
beyond which termination should only rarely be legitimate.
We have not intended to use any term pejoratively or as 
an ideological argument, as Van Bogaert seems to deduce. 
Though words often simply have meanings we ascribe to them, 
I take the word ‘elusive’ to mean ‘difficult to find or catch, to 
understand’, not ‘misleading’ as Van Bogaert suggests.5  
The argument concerning separation-survivability actually 
precedes Roe v. Wade, which was a legal, not a moral position, 
such as ours, and not enforceable. The court suggested as a 
compromise that States of the Union, who so wished, could use 
separation-survivability as a cut-off to abortion. Several States 
allowed ‘termination’ of the fetus during labour at the crowning 
of the head, before it was actually delivered and became a 
‘person’ with legally protected rights. President George B Bush 
recently stopped this. In response to Gert’s supposition we 
suggest a moral coincidence between the separation-survivable 
fetus and the neonate, and that some of the recognition 
accorded the latter might also be applicable to the former. 
This is in accordance with general societal intuitions and legal 
practice, and may not be as inconsequential as Van Bogaert 
seems to think, since there are societies where termination of 
third-trimester fetuses is not frowned upon. As to the question 
about the influence of ‘outside factors’ on morality, is it not 
what responsible applied ethics is all about – the application 
of context and circumstance to moral thoughts and deeds? The 
challenge to bioethics is that we constantly attempt to make 
moral sense out of the application of (often new and innovative) 
scientific knowledge. Humankind is characterised by a constant 
inquisitive involvement with the world that surrounds us and 
with which we are inextricably entwined.
As to Van Bogaert’s criticism of the construction of our 
argument, the point is not that a 25-week fetus is necessarily 
separation-survivable; whatever the cut-off, we suggest 
that such a point exists. Our quest was to examine its moral 
significance. We do not disregard the moral significance of 
sentience, but separation-survivability probably precedes 
its advent, and the latter, not sentience (which it obviously 
would acquire later) would determine the fetus’s possibility of 
entering into and survival in the world.
Van Bogaert’s position on potentiality is unclear. It is certainly 
a significant argument, with three qualifications. Firstly, it needs 
to be of a moral nature (be human potentiality with the definite 
endpoint of the creation of a person capable of moral thoughts 
and deeds). Secondly, it is only relevant once twinning has 
ceased to be possible, since only then can one sensibly refer to 
the potentiality of a particular identifiable individual. Thirdly, 
extrinsic potentiality, i.e. a favourable environment in which 
to develop, is as important in our conception of potentiality 
as intrinsic, i.e. genetic, potentiality. We draw on insights 
from existential phenomenology to posit that speciesism (in 
a moderate guise) expresses fundamental aspects of human 
self-understanding and consequent self-esteem. The human 
species is essential for the possibility of sense-making and sense 
constitution in and of the world through its particular use of 
what Popper called the ‘higher functions’ of language.  Without 
the essentially human phenomenon of valuation, a function of 
a personal reflective mode of being, in terms of which ethics 
and morality occurs in our world, it would be impossible to 
develop a consistent moral argument. The very possibility 
of morality is therefore dependent on humanity, arguments 
that some primates express (a rudimentary form of) morality 
notwithstanding. Of course this is anthropocentric, but can any 
animal, or can we, sensibly, convincingly argue to the contrary? 
But note that this is not an absolute ‘right to life’ argument 
for all ‘human beings’ (like anencephalic fetuses, irreversible 
comatose patients, etc.); nor is it an argument against ‘animal 
rights’ or in favour of cruelty to animals. It simply means that 
favouring ‘our’ species is inevitable for our mode of being.
I concede the moral challenge of the ‘middle road’, which 
in part motivated our article. But in practice many supporters 
of free choice actually follow this path, since they generally 
reject ‘late’ (third-trimester) termination and argue that one 
or more characteristics acquired during pregnancy preclude 
termination beyond a certain point. Individuation is usually 
regarded as having been confirmed at gastrulation (endometrial 
implantation). Psychological personhood, usually defined as 
the ability to value one’s life, to be self-conscious, to be aware 
of one self as some sort of continuing substance of existence, is 
gradually attained some time after birth. We argue that in Van 
Bogaert’s idiom perhaps 5 out of 10 is adequate for a ‘right to 
life’.
These matters will be dealt with more systematically and 
comprehensively, and the applicable philosophical arguments 
developed more extensively, in our forthcoming article in the 
South African Journal of Philosophy.
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